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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.

:

Case No, 890268-CA

i

RONALD GEORGE STORRS,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

ratngory No 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal I s from a conviction of possession of a
cont xc>] led si lbst ai ice, a second degree felony, under Utah Cr Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court
correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized
from his person after his arrest.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Relevant text of constitutional and statutory
provisions pertinent to the i eso] uti 01 i nl t he i ssue presented uri
appeal i s contained i n the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Rmidi i HI <;enn|t« s t n n f , wa i i ha i«n" i wi'li •wo
counts of possession ol a controlled substance, a second degree
felony, under Utah Code ~
•^

,

* 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1989), and
Pursuant

to a plea bargain, defendant entered and the trial court accepted

a plea of no contest to one count of possession of a controlled
substance (R. 74-85).

The court sentenced defendant to an

indeterminate term of not more than five years

in the Utah State

Prison and ordered that he pay a $1,000 fine plus $250 to the
Victim Reparations Fund, but stayed execution of the prison term
and placed defendant on eighteen months' probation (R. 105-06).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The following facts are relevant to defendant's
challenge to the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress
evidence seized in a search of his person incident to arrest.
On November 30, 1988, several police officers executed
a search warrant at a residence in which defendant was present.
That warrant authorized the search of the residence, two
vehicles, and M[a]ny person in the residence or any person
arriving at the residence during the search" for evidence of drug
2
possession, use, and distribution.

Upon entering the residence,

two police officers, Officer Caldwell and Officer Blackhurst,
observed defendant in a hallway between the kitchen and a
bathroom.

Another man lay in the doorway of the bathroom, his

feet inside and upper body outside in the hallway; a syringe lay
next to him on the floor.

The officers estimated that defendant

was approximately three to five feet from the bathroom and the
man on the floor when they first saw defendant (R. 139-41, 145,
Pursuant to defendant's motion, the court sentenced him to a
third degree felony term.
2
The original of the warrant apparently was never offered or
received into evidence in the trial court. However, the parties
and the court appear to have agreed to proceed with a copy of the
warrant, which is contained in the record on appeal (R. 66-70).

147# 149-51, 156).
Officer Caldwell proceeded downstairs where he and
other officers discovered two individuals smoking cocaine out of
a can.

They also found quantities of cocaine and LSD as well as

Debbie Nielsen, the owner of the residence, whom they arrested
for several drug offenses.

Meanwhile, Officer Blackhurst engaged

defendant in the upstairs hallway, indicating that he was a
police officer there to execute a search warrant.
responded by laughing at Blackhurst.

Defendant

Concluding that defendant

was "high on something," Blackhurst handcuffed him, conducted a
pat-down search of him for weapons (discovering nothing), and
placed him in the custody of an Officer Frampton who took
defendant to a front room for security observation.

Frampton

described defendant's demeanor as "quiet and mellow" after
defendant had been handcuffed and had calmed down (R. 141, 14951, 157).
After Officer Caldwell returned upstairs from the
basement, Officer Frampton formally arrested defendant "for being
in possession of cocaine" and conducted a pat-down search in
which a small quantity of a white powdery substance was found in
one of defendant's pockets (R. 142, 158-59).
Referring to what the officers knew prior to entering
the residence with the search warrant, Officer Caldwell testified
as follows:
[W]e had made several undercover narcotics
buys out of the residence already, and we
knew that every time that we entered that
residence with, or our undercover police
officers entered the residence, that there
were several people present, none of which we

knew who they were. The, generally, most of
the people were different each time the
undercover officers went there. We knew that
drugs were being sold in large quantities
from the residence and that several people
were frequenting that residence, including
juveniles.
(R. 143).
Prior to entering his plea of no contest, defendant
filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his person
after his arrest.

He argued that, under the fourth amendment,

the search of defendant was unlawful because (1) it was beyond
the scope of the search authorized by the warrant, and (2) there
was no independent probable cause upon which the police could
justify a warrantless search of defendant (R. 20, 36-39, 161-63).
The State argued that the search of defendant which resulted in
the seizure of the suspected contraband was justified as a search
incident to defendant's lawful arrest (R. 41-45, 160-61).

In a

memorandum decision, the trial court denied the motion to
suppress, ruling that, although the search of defendant could not
be supported by the search warrant alone or justified as a search
for dangerous weapons (an exception to the warrant requirement as
recognized by this Court in State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989)), it
was sustainable as a search incident to a lawful arrest (R. 4665).
After denial of the motion to suppress, defendant
entered and the court accepted a no contest plea (R. 83-85).

.i.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to
suppress because the challenged evidence was lawfully seized
incident to an arrest supported by probable cause.
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT
Defendant appeals after entry and acceptance of his no
contest plea.

A plea of no contest, although it indicates only

that the defendant does not challenge the charges in the
information or indictment, has the same effect as a plea of
guilty.

Utah Code Ann. S 77-13-2(3) (1982).

It is settled law

that a voluntary guilty plea or no contest plea is a waiver of
the right to appeal all nonjurisdictional violations (e.g.,
fourth amendment issues).

State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah

Ct. App. 1988); State v. Mclntire, 93 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 19 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).

See also State v. Beck, 584 P.2d 870 (Utah

1978) (per curiam); State v. Yeck, 566 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1977).
However, in Sery, this Court created an exception to this general
rule, stating that
[it) is inapplicable where . . . the plea
entered by the defendant with the consent of
the prosecution and accepted by the trial
judge specifically preserves the suppression
issue for appeal and allows withdrawal of the
plea if defendant's arguments in favor of
suppression are accepted by the appellate
court.

The opinion in State v. Mclntire, 93 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988), was withdrawn prior to publication in the Pacific
Reporter because the Court subsequently learned that Mclntire had
actually entered a conditional plea and therefore, under Sery,
was not precluded from raising fourth amendment issues on appeal.
State v. Mclntire, 768 P.2d 970, 971 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
The State cites the first Mclntire opinion not as published
precedent, but simply for its discussion of waiver of pre-plea
constitutional violations.
-5-

758 P.2d at 938 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis
added).

Under this standard, in the instant case there may be

some question of whether a conditional no contest plea which
preserved suppression issues for review was actually accepted by
the trial court.

The only reference in the record to

preservation of those issues for review appears in the trial
court's signed minute entry regarding the taking of the plea.
There, the court stated:
Mr. Means [defendant's counsel] addressed
the Court and indicated this matter has been
discussed at length by counsel and the
defendant now intends to enter a plea of No
Contest to Count 4 of the Information
reserving the right to appeal the Court's
ruling on the Motion to Suppress. Counsel
also indicated he has discussed the matter
with the defendant and the defendant has
initialled the "Statement in Advance of
Plea.11
(R. 83). Defendant's signed statement for the plea does not
explicitly preserve suppression issues for appeal; defendant
merely crossed-out and did not initial paragraph 10(F) which
reads:

H

I am giving up my right to appeal the verdict of the

Court" (R. 77). Thus, it is not entirely clear from the minute
entry or defendant's signed statement that the prosecution
consented to and the trial court accepted a conditional no
contest plea that "specifically preservefd] the suppression issue
for appeal and allows withdrawal of the plea if defendant's
arguments in favor of suppression are accepted by the appellate
court.-

Sery# 758 P.2d at 938. Given the unique nature of the

•6-

conditional plea approved by the majority in Sery,

it is

extremely important that the record on appeal clearly reflect
that such a conditional plea has been entered with the
prosecution's consent and that the court has accepted the same.
Defendant did not carefully comply with the requirements of Sery,
in that he failed to create an explicit record on the conditional
plea.
Despite the deficiency in the record, the State will
address defendant's arguments regarding denial of his suppression
motion.

It does so because the record as a whole probably is at

least marginally adequate to establish that defendant entered and
the trial court accepted a conditional plea pursuant to Sery.
However, this should not preclude the Court from declining to
reach the suppression issue, if it concludes that there was
inadequate compliance with Sery.

At the very least, the Court

should admonish future defendants desiring to enter conditional
pleas pursuant to Sery to provide a more explicit record on the
matter than that provided in the instant case.
Finally, because defendant did not raise or develop in
the trial court the state constitutional argument under article
I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution that he now advances on
appeal, the state constitutional question should not be addressed
by this Court.

State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct.

4
A conditional plea of the sort approved in Sery is not
expressly authorized by statute or rule, and has never been
approved by the Utah Supreme Court. Indeed, there is some
question about how that court would rule on the issue if
presented with it. See Sery, 758 P.2d at 949-50 (Davison, J.,
dissenting) (where Judge Davidson presents a thoughtful argument
against the conditional plea approved by the majority).
-7-

App. 1989).
question.

Accordingly, the State does not address this

Defendant's explanation that that issue was not argued

or briefed below because there is no case law upon which to
develop an argument under article I, section 14, is not
persuasive.

Indeed, his citation to State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803

(Utah 1986), where the Utah Supreme Court suggested an analytic
technique that could be employed in the analysis of state
constitutional issues, id. at 806 (citing State v. Jewett, 500
A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985)), defeats that very argument.

Although there

may not be any Utah appellate decisions directly on point, an
argument for an interpretation of article I, section 14 different
from that given the fourth amendment obviously can be made with
Jewett's technique and by reference to case law from other
jurisdictions.

See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 102 Wash.2d 432, 688

P.2d 136 (1984) (rejecting the United States Supreme Court's
fourth amendment analysis in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213
(1983), and retaining "Aguilar-Spinelli test" on state
constitutional grounds); People v. Bigelow, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630,
636-37, 488 N.E.2d 451, 457-58 (1985) (rejecting on state
constitutional grounds the "good faith exception" to the
exclusionary rule enunciated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897 (1984)).

_Q_

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS; THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT
WHICH RESULTED IN THE SEIZURE OF SUSPECTED
CONTRABAND WAS JUSTIFIED AS A SEARCH INCIDENT
TO A LAWFUL ARREST.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress because the police officers did not have
probable cause to arrest him, thereby rendering the subsequent
search unconstitutional.

In reviewing the trial court's ruling,

this Court applies the following standard:
In considering the trial court's action in
denying defendant's motion to suppress, we
will not disturb its factual evaluation
unless its findings are clearly erroneous.
The trial judge is in the best position to
assess the credibility and accuracy of the
witnesses' divergent testimonies. However,
in assessing the trial court's legal
conclusions based upon its factual findings,
we afford it no deference but apply a
"correction of error" standard.
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(citations omitted).

But see State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1268-

69 (Utah 1987), State v. Galleqos, 712 P.2d 207, 208-09 (Utah
1985); and State v. Seryf 758 P.2d 935, 941-42 (Utah Ct. App.
1988) (which suggest that the "clearly erroneous" standard of
review applies to both the trial court's factual determination
and its legal conclusion).

Because the facts surrounding

defendant's arrest and the subsequent search of his person
generally are not in dispute, this Court need only assess the
trial court'8 legal conclusion that the search was
constitutional.

-9-

In his brief, defendant concedes that "his initial
brief detention and pat-down was reasonable for the safety of the
officers conducting the search and to secure the premises."
of App. at 9.

Br.

However, he claims the search of his person which

occurred at the time of his arrest violated the fourth amendment
5
because the arrest was not supported by probable cause.
In
making this claim, defendant focuses on the question of whether
there was probable cause to believe defendant possessed cocaine,
the basis upon which the arresting officers stated they made the
arrest.

That question will be addressed first.
In State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107 (Utah Ct. App. 1988),

cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989), this Court stated:
Another exception to the warrant
requirement permits a search incident to a
lawful arrest. Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2
(1988) provides authority for peace officers
to make an arrest with or without a warrant.
The standard for evaluating an arrest for an
offense not committed in the officer's
presence is an objective one: "[WJhether
from the facts known to the officer, and the
inferences which fairly might be drawn
therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in
his position would be justified in believing
that the suspect had committed the offense."
State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1983)
(quoting State v. Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318,
495 P.2d 1259, 1260 (Utah 1972)). The law
enforcement officer need not have "certain
knowledge of the guilt of the suspect."
Hatcher at 1260. A valid arrest occurs
whenever "a crime under which the arrest is
made and a crime for which probable cause
exists are in some fashion related. . . . "
By agreeing with the trial court's rejection of the warrant and
the "dangerous weapon" exception to the warrant requirement (see
State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert,
denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989)) as bases for upholding the
search, defendant also argues that they are not alternative
grounds to justify the search. Br. of App. at 9.

Mills v. Wainwriqht, 415 F.2d 790 (5th Cir.
1969)- . • .
762 P.2d at 1111. The Court also noted:
There is, however, an important distinction
between the evidence required for conviction
and that required to constitute sufficient
probable cause for arrest. As stated in
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69
S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949):
The court's rulings . . . illustrate the difference in standards
and latitude allowed in passing
upon the distinct issues of
probable cause and guilt. Guilt in
a criminal case must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt and by
evidence confined to that which
long experience in the common-law
tradition . . . has crystallized
into rules of evidence consistent
with that standard. . . . However,
if those standards were to be made
applicable in determining probable
cause for arrest or for search and
seizure . . . few indeed would be
the situations in which an officer,
charged with protecting the public
interest in enforcing the law,
could take effective action toward
that end.
Id. at 174, 69 S.Ct. at 1310.
762 P.2d at 1112. Under these standards, although perhaps a
somewhat close question, the officers had probable cause to
arrest defendant for the offense of possession of cocaine or some
other controlled substance (see Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
(Supp. 1989)).
6

As the trial court summarized in its memorandum

Section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) provides:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and
intentionally to possess or use a controlled
substance, unless it was obtained under a
valid prescription or order or directly from

-11-

decision:
In this case the officers had actual
knowledge and probable cause to believe that
illegal drugs were being used in and
distributed from the premises in which
defendant was found; a substantial amount of
suspected illegal drugs and drug
paraphernalia were found on the premises, a
significant part of which was in close
proximity to the defendant; the officers knew
that a different group and variety of people
frequented said premises for no apparent
reason other than to obtain illegal drugs;
officer Blackhurst perceived that the
defendant appeared to be "high" on something;
and Officer Frampton observed that after an
initial period of agitation, the defendant
became "mellow.M
(R. 64). From these facts, the officers, who had experience in
7
drug investigations, would be justified in believing that
defendant possessed cocaine or some other controlled substance.
Even if it were assumed, arguendo, that the officers
did not have probable cause to arrest defendant for possession
under S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), they clearly had probable cause to
arrest defendant for a violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-378(2)(a)(ill) (Supp. 1989).

That section provides that it is

unlawful

Cont. a practitioner while acting in the
course of his professional practice, or as
otherwise authorized by this subsection[.]
7
The experience and expertise of trained law enforcement
officers is a significant factor in assessing whether probable
cause existed, since a trained officer is often able to perceive
and articulate meaning in conduct that would be wholly innocent
to the untrained observer. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 n.2
(1979); State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986); State
v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765
P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987).
-12-

for any person knowingly and intentionally to
be present where controlled substances are
being used or possessed in violation of this
chapter and the use of possession is open,
obvious, apparent, and not concealed from
those present; however, a person may not be
convicted under this subsection if the
evidence shows that he did not use the
substance himself or advise, encourage, or
assist anyone else to do so; any incidence of
prior unlawful use of controlled substances
by the defendant may be admitted to rebut
this defense[.]
Plainly, given the situation that existed in the residence upon
the officers' arrival, coupled with their knowledge that the
residence was frequently the scene of illegal drug use and
possession, the officers could reasonably have believed that
defendant was knowingly and intelligently present where
controlled substances were being unlawfully and openly used and
possessed.

That there may not have been any evidence to

establish with a high level of certainty that defendant either
used the controlled substance himself or advised, encouraged, or
assisted someone else to do so, such evidence is not necessary to
constitute probable cause to arrest for a violation of S 58-378(2)(a)(iii).

The second clause of that subsection relates only

to evidence pertinent to conviction, not the establishment of
probable cause to arrest.

As Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.

160, 174 (1949) (cited and quoted by this Court in Ayala, 762
P.2d at 1112) makes clear, "there is a significant difference
between the quantum of evidence required for conviction and that
required to constitute sufficient probable cause for an arrest;"
much less evidence is required for probable cause to arrest.
State v. Richards, 116 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 33 (Utah Ct. App.

-H-

1989).

Furthermore, that the officers did not specify a

violation of S 58-37-8(2)(a)(iii) as a basis for their arrest of
defendant (indeed, they specifically stated that they arrested
defendant for possession of cocaine) does not invalidate the
arrest for lack of probable cause.

The United States Supreme

Court has said:
[T]he fact that the officer does not have the
state of mind which is hypothecated by the
reasons which provide the legal justification
for the officer's action does not invalidate
the action taken so long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify
the action.
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978).

See also

People v. Arterberry, 431 Mich. 381, 429 N.W.2d 574, 575 (1988).
In sum, because there was probable cause to arrest
defendant for a violation of either S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) or S 5837-8(2)(a)(iii), the officers, incident to defendant's arrest,
could search his person for weapons, contraband, or other
evidence of the commission of a crime. Ayala, 762 P.2d at 1113.
See also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
Therefore, the trial court properly denied defendant's
motion to suppress.

The evidence was validly seized incident to

p

a lawful arrest.

Perhaps the search of defendant is also sustainable under the
provision in the warrant that authorizes the search of "any and
all persons present or anyone arriving during the search" (R.
69). See generally 2 LaFave, Search & Seizure, S 4.5(e) at 23033 (1987). However, because the search of defendant is so
plainly justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest, the
State has chosen not to address that issue.
_1 A .

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
affirm defendant's conviction.
/6>t*c"day of October,
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